

Security requirement

Database Systems

Deutsche Telekom Group

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Summary
Database Systems - General Security Requirements

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Table of Contents

1.	Introduction	4
2.	Hardening	5
2.1.	Default databases	9
2.2.	Users and roles	9
2.3.	Service minimization	9
2.4.	Passwords	10
2.5.	Principle of least privilege	14
2.6.	SQL functions and packages	15
2.7.	SQL extensions with operating-system or network access	15
2.8.	Access rights	16
3.	Data communications	17
4.	System monitoring	18
4.1.	Logging	18
4.2.	Auditing and monitoring	23
5.	Technical Baseline Security for IT/NT Systems	25
5.1.	Authentication and authorization	25

1. Introduction

This security document has been prepared based on the general security policies of the group.

The security requirement is used as a basis for an approval in the PSA process, among other things. It also serves as an implementation standard for units which do not participate in the PSA process. These requirements shall be taken into account from the very beginning, including during the planning and decision-making processes.

When implementing these security requirements, the precedence of national, international and supranational law shall be observed.

2. Hardening

This chapter lists the requirements for hardening database systems. The measures are comparable to those for hardening the operating system. They reduce the likelihood of successful attacks on database systems and/or the consequences thereof.

Req 1	The software used must be obtained from trusted sources and checked for integrity.
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The software used on the system must be obtained from trusted sources and checked for integrity before installation. This requirement applies to all types of software:

- Firmware and microcode for hardware components
- Operating systems
- Software Libraries
- Application Software
- Pre-integrated application solutions, such as software appliances or containers

as well as other software that may be used.

Trusted Sources

Trusted sources are generally considered to be:

- the official distribution and supply channels of the supplier
- third party distributors, provided they are authorized by the supplier and are a legitimate part of the supplier's delivery channels
- internet downloads, if they are made from official provisioning servers of the supplier or authorized distributors
 - (1) If the provisioning server offers various forms of downloads, those protected by encryption or cryptographic signatures must be preferred to those without such protection.
 - (2) If the provisioning server secures the transport layer using cryptographic protocols (e.g. HTTPS, sftp), the associated server certificates or server keys/fingerprints must be validated with each download to confirm the identity of the provisioning server; if validation fails, the download must be cancelled and the provisioning server has to be considered an untrusted source.

Integrity Check

The integrity check is intended to ensure that the received software is free of manipulation and malware infection. If available, the mechanisms implemented by the supplier must be used for checking.

Valid mechanisms are:

- physical seals or permanently applied certificates of authenticity (if the software is provided on physical media)
- comparison of cryptographic hash values (e.g. SHA256, SHA512) of the received software against target values, which the supplier provides separately
- verification of cryptographic signatures (e.g. GPG, certificates) with which the supplier provides its software

In addition, a check of the software using an anti-virus or anti-malware scanner is recommended (if the vendor has not implemented any of the aforementioned integrity protection mechanisms for its software, this verification is mandatory).

Extended integrity checking when pulling software from public registries

Public registries allow developers to make any of their own software projects available for use. The range includes projects from well-known companies with controlled development processes, as well as from smaller providers or amateur developers.

Examples of such registries are:

- Code registries (e.g. GitHub, Bitbucket, SourceForge, Python Package Index)
- Container registries (e.g. Docker Hub)

Software from public registries must undergo an extended integrity check before deployment.

In addition to the integrity check components described in the previous section, the extended check is intended to explicitly ensure that the software actually performs its function as described, does not contain inherent security risks such as intentionally implemented malware features, and is not affected by known security vulnerabilities. If the software has direct dependencies on third-party software projects (dependencies are very typical in open source software), which must also be obtained and installed for the use of the software, these must be included in the extended integrity check.

Methods for an extended integrity check can be, for example:

- Strict validation of project/package names (avoidance of confusion with deliberately imitated malicious software projects)
- dynamic code analysis / structured functional checks in a test environment
- static code analysis using a linter (e.g. Splint, JSLint, pylint)
- Examination using a security vulnerability scanner (e.g. Qualys, Nessus)
- Examination using a container security scanner (e.g. JFrog Xray, Harbor, Clair, Docker Scan)
- Examination using an SCA (Software Composition Analysis) tool or dependency scanner (e.g. OWASP Dependency Check, Snyk)

The test methods must be selected and appropriately combined according to the exact form of software delivery (source code, binaries/artifacts, containers).

Motivation: Software supply chains contain various attack vectors. An attacker can start at various points to manipulate software or introduce his own routines and damage or control the target environment in which the software is subsequently used. The attack can occur on the transport or transmission path or on the provisioning source itself. Accordingly, an attack is facilitated if software is not obtained from official and controlled sources or if an integrity check is omitted.

There is a particular risk for software obtained from public registries, as these are open to anyone for the provision of software projects. Perfidious attack methods are known, in which the attacker first provides completely inconspicuous, functional software for a while and as soon as it has established itself and found a certain spread, deliberately hidden malicious code is integrated in future versions. Other methods rely on similar-sounding project names for widely used existing projects or overruling version numbers to inject manipulated software into any solutions based on them.

Implementation example: Obtain the software via the official delivery channels of the supplier. Upon receipt of the software, immediately check for integrity using cryptographic checksums, as provided by the supplier, as well as scan for any infections by known malware using anti-malware / anti-virus scanners. Storage of the tested software on an internal, protected file storage and further use (e.g. rollout to the target systems) only from there.

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:

- Unauthorized modification of data
- Unnoticeable feasible attacks
- Attacks motivated and facilitated by information disclosure or visible security weaknesses

ID: 3.01-2/9.0

Req 2	Only required software may be used on the system.
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In the installation routines for software provided by the supplier, individual components of the software are often preselected as standard installations, which are not necessary for the operation and function of a specific system. This also includes parts of software that are installed as application examples (e.g. default web pages, sample databases, test data), but are typically not used afterwards.

Such components must be specifically deselected (not installed) during the installation of the system or - if deselection during installation is not possible - removed immediately afterwards.

In principle, no software may be used that is not required for the operation, maintenance or function of the system.

Motivation: Vulnerabilities in a system's software are gateways for attackers. By uninstalling unnecessary components, the potential attack surfaces can be significantly reduced.

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:

- Unauthorized use of services or resources
- Attacks motivated and facilitated by information disclosure or visible security weaknesses

ID: 3.01-3/9.0

Req 3	Features that are not required in the software and hardware used must be deactivated.
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During the initial installation of software, features may have been activated by default that are not necessary for the operation and functionality of the specific system. Features are usually an integral part of the software that cannot be deleted or uninstalled individually.

Such features must be disabled immediately after the initial installation through the software's configuration settings, so that they remain permanently disabled even after the system is rebooted.

Even before delivery or during initial commissioning, features may have been activated by default in the hardware that are not required for the purpose of the specific system. Such functions, for example unnecessary interfaces, must also be permanently deactivated immediately after initial commissioning.

Motivation: A system's hardware or software often contains enabled features that are not being used. Such features can be an unnecessary target for manipulation. Furthermore, there is a potential that unauthorized access to areas or data of the system can be created.

Implementation example: [Example 1]

Deactivation of debugging functions in the software that are used in the event of fault analysis, but do not have to be active during normal operation.

[Example 2]

Disabling unused network interfaces of a server.

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:

- Unauthorized use of services or resources
- Attacks motivated and facilitated by information disclosure or visible security weaknesses

ID: 3.01-4/9.0

Req 4	Unnecessary services must be disabled.
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After the installation of systems and software products, supplier-preset, local or network-accessible services are often active that are not required for the operation and functionality of the specific system in the intended operating environment.

However, in principle only the services actually required may be active on a system.

Accordingly, all services that are not required on a system must be completely disabled immediately after installation. It must be ensured that these services remain disabled even after the system is restarted.

Motivation: Active services that are not required unnecessarily increase the attack surface of a system and, as a direct consequence, the risk of a successful compromise. This risk can be further increased if - as is often observed with services that are not required - a targeted examination and optimization of the configuration with regard to security does not take place sufficiently.

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:

- Unauthorized use of services or resources
- Attacks motivated and facilitated by information disclosure or visible security weaknesses

ID: 3.01-5/9.0

Req 5 The accessibility of activated services must be restricted.

In principle, a service provided must be completely deactivated on all interfaces of the system through which accessibility of the service is not required for the proper operation of the system. The deactivation is primarily to be implemented by a corresponding configuration of the service or operating system. In cases where the available configuration options do not allow deactivation on individual interfaces, a local filter ("Host Firewall") may instead be used on the system to block access to the service via unnecessary interfaces.

The accessibility of a service via the required interfaces must also be restricted to legitimate communication partners. The restriction must be implemented by a corresponding configuration of the service or operating system or by means of a local filter ("Host Firewall"). Alternatively, this task may be outsourced to a network-side filter element, provided that the system is located in a separate network segment and communication with this segment is only possible via the network-side filter element.

Motivation: By deactivating services on interfaces through which accessibility is not necessary, as well as by restricting possible communication partners, the attack surface offered by a system can be greatly reduced.

Implementation example: An SNMP service used to monitor a system is enabled exclusively on the dedicated management network interface of the system. A firewall also regulates that only the legitimate monitoring system of the infrastructure environment can reach this service.

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:

- Unauthorized use of services or resources
- Attacks motivated and facilitated by information disclosure or visible security weaknesses

ID: 3.01-6/9.0

Req 6 Known vulnerabilities in the software or hardware of the system must be fixed or protected against misuse.

Known vulnerabilities in software and hardware components must be fixed by installing available system updates from the supplier (e.g. patches, updates/upgrades). Alternatively, the use of workarounds (acute solutions that do not fix the vulnerability, but effectively prevent exploitation) is permissible. Workarounds should only be used temporarily and should be replaced by a regular system update as soon as possible in order to completely close the vulnerabilities.

Components that contain known, unrecoverable vulnerabilities must not be used in a system.

The treatment of newly discovered vulnerabilities must also be continuously ensured for the entire deployment phase of the system and implemented in the continuous operating processes of security patch management.

Motivation: The use of components without fixing contained vulnerabilities significantly increases the risk of a successful compromise. The attacker is additionally favored by the fact that, as a rule, not only detailed information on vulnerabilities that have already become known is openly available, but often also already adapted attack tools that facilitate active exploitation.

Implementation example: Following the initial installation of an operating system from an official installation medium, all currently available patches and security updates are installed.

Additional information:

The primary sources of known vulnerabilities in software/hardware are lists in the release notes as well as the security advisories from the official reporting channels of the supplier or independent CERTs. In particular, the reporting channels are sensibly integrated into continuous processes of security patch management for a system, so that newly discovered vulnerabilities can be registered promptly and led into operational remedial measures.

As a complementary measure to the detection of potentially still contained types of vulnerabilities that have in principle already become known, targeted vulnerability investigations of the system can be carried out. Particularly specialized tools such as automated vulnerability scanners are suitable for this purpose. Examples include: Tenable Nessus, Qualys Scanner Appliance.

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:

- Unauthorized access to the system

- Unauthorized access or tapping of data
- Unauthorized modification of data
- Unauthorized use of services or resources
- Disruption of availability
- Denial of executed activities
- Unnoticeable feasible attacks
- Attacks motivated and facilitated by information disclosure or visible security weaknesses

ID: 3.01-10/9.0

2.1. Default databases

Req 7 (Default) databases that are not required must be deleted on the database system.

Motivation: When installing database systems, test or practice databases are often installed which are not required once the database goes productive. In the past, vulnerabilities of these test databases have become known which allow an attacker to gain privileged rights on the database system. Such knowledge enables an attacker to access the database system. Therefore, all databases that are not required shall be deleted.

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:

- Unauthorized use of services or resources

ID: 3.16-7/9.0

2.2. Users and roles

Req 8 (Default) users and (default) roles that are not required must be deleted.

Motivation: When installing a database system, a large number of users and roles are automatically installed, which are not required to operate the database. These are envisaged, for instance, for practice and test databases. Knowledge of default users and roles allows an attacker to gain (privileged) access to the database system. Therefore, users and roles that are not needed for database functions shall be deleted.

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:

- Unauthorized access to the system

ID: 3.16-8/9.0

2.3. Service minimization

Req 9 Multiple database instances may only be operated together on one operating system instance (with physical or virtualized hardware) if they

- have the same low protection requirements,
- are under a single customer administrative authority and
- are operated, in terms of administration, by the same group of people.

Motivation: Operating multiple database instances together increases the risk of users gaining unauthorized access to instances for which they are neither technically nor administratively responsible.

Implementation example: To separate the individual database instances, administrators can use physical server hardware as well as virtualization solutions.

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:

- Unauthorized access to the system
- Unauthorized access or tapping of data
- Unauthorized use of services or resources

- Unnoticeable feasible attacks

ID: 3.16-9/9.0

2.4. Passwords

Req 10	If passwords are used as an authentication attribute, those must be stored using a suitable and approved "Password Hashing" method to protect against offline-attacks like brute force or dictionary attacks.
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This requirement relates to the storage of passwords in all types of user databases, as used in this system, in order to authenticate incoming access (local or remote) by users or other systems.

If an attacker obtains the copy of a user database of the system, he is able to bring it into a fully independent environment and utilize automatized dictionary or brute force attacks to determine contained passwords. Specialized tools in combination with high computing power allow for high cracking rates in a relatively short period of time, if protective measures are insufficient. Due to the independency from the source system, such an offline attack happens unnoticed.

The following countermeasure must be implemented, since this ensures best possible protection against offline attacks:

- passwords must be stored using a cryptographic one-way function (known as "Password Hashing") that is recognized as effective for this purpose and is classified as secure at the current state of the art.

Please Note: valid password hashing algorithms are described in Security Requirement Catalog "3.50 Cryptographic Algorithms and Security Protocols".

Explicitly NOT PERMISSIBLE is:

- to store passwords in cleartext
- to store passwords in any format which can be directly backcalculated
- to store passwords using reversible encryption

Please Note:

In this context, "directly backcalculatable formats" refers to those that simply encode the password, without involving a secret key in the transformation process. Since the password will no longer show up as original cleartext after it has been processed, those formats may easily be mistaken to provide confidentiality. Effectively, they do not offer any protection. The encoding is fixed and therefore an attacker can easily make use of it to compute the original cleartext password from the encoded string.

Examples for directly backcalculatable formats are: "base64", "rot13"

"Reversible" are all encryption methods which, using the appropriate key, enable encrypted content to be transformed back into the original content. Accordingly, with reversible encryption there is always the challenge of keeping the key secure and protecting it from unauthorized access. Reversibility is a required fundamental property in many areas of encryption applications, e.g. for transferring confidential messages, but it is counterproductive for storing passwords: a stored password must remain comparable by means of technical methods, but it must no longer be possible to convert it back into plain text in order to protect it as well as possible from unauthorized viewing.

Examples for reversible encryption are: "AES", "CHACHA20", "3DES", "RSA"

Motivation: Without protective measures, an attacker in possession of a user database copy is able to determine masses of contained passwords in short time by merely trying out character string combinations or making use of dictionaries. Passwords stored in cleartext or any backcalculatable format are fully defenseless to an offline attack. Once a password has been ascertained it can be used by an attacker for unauthorized access to the system and the data on it.

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:

- Unauthorized access to the system
- Unauthorized access or tapping of data
- Unauthorized modification of data

- Unauthorized use of services or resources
- Denial of executed activities
- Attacks motivated and facilitated by information disclosure or visible security weaknesses

ID: 3.01-24/9.0

Req 11	If a password is used as an authentication attribute, it must have at least 12 characters and contain three of the following categories: lower-case letters, upper-case letters, digits and special characters.
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A system may only accept passwords that comply with the following complexity rules:

- Minimum length of 12 characters.
- Comprising at least three of the following four character categories:
 - lower-case letters
 - upper-case letters
 - digits
 - special characters

The usable maximum length of passwords shall not be limited to less than 25 characters. This will provide more freedom to End Users when composing individual memorable passwords and helps to prevent undesired behavior in password handling.

When a password is assigned, the system must ensure that the password meets these policies. This must be preferably enforced by technical measures; if such cannot be implemented, organizational measures must be established. If a central system is used for user authentication [see also Root Security Requirements Document[i] "3.69 IAM (Identity Access Management) - Framework"], it is valid to forward or delegate this task to that central system.

Permissible deviation in the password minimum length

Under security-related criteria, conditions can potentially be identified for a system that enable the minimum password length to be reduced:

- It is generally permissible to reduce the minimum password length for systems that use additional independent authentication attributes within the authentication process in addition to the password (implementation of 2-Factor or Multi-Factor Authentication).
- Any reduction in the minimum password length must be assessed individually by a technical security advisor (e. g. a PSM from Telekom Security) and confirmed as permissible. In the assessment, the surrounding technical, organizational and legal framework parameters must be taken into account, as well as the system-specific protection requirements and the potential amount of damage in the event of security incidents.
- The absolute minimum value of 8 characters length for passwords must not be undercut.

Motivation: Passwords with the above complexity offer contemporary robustness against attacks coupled with acceptable user friendliness. Passwords with this level of complexity have proven their efficiency in practice. Trivial and short passwords are susceptible to brute force and dictionary attacks and are therefore easy for attackers to determine. Once a password has been ascertained it can be used by an attacker for unauthorized access to the system and the data on it.

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:

- Unauthorized access to the system
- Unauthorized access or tapping of data
- Unauthorized modification of data
- Unauthorized use of services or resources
- Denial of executed activities

ID: 3.01-26/9.0

Req 12	If a password is used as an authentication attribute for technical accounts, it must have at least 30 characters and contain three of the following categories: lower-case letters, upper-case letters, digits and special characters.
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Technical user accounts are characterized by the fact that they are not used by people. Instead, they are used to authenticate and authorize systems to each other or applications on a system.

A system must only use passwords for technical user accounts that meet the following complexity:

- Minimum length of 30 characters
- Comprising at least three of the following four character categories:
 - lower-case letters
 - upper-case letters
 - digits
 - special characters

Motivation: Due to their use in machine-to-machine (M2M) communication scenarios, technical user accounts are often equipped with privileges that can be of high interest to an attacker to compromise infrastructures. Without mechanisms of extensive compromise detection, the risk of a password being determined or broken by an attacker can increase significantly over time. A significant increase in password length counteracts these risks and can also be implemented particularly easily in M2M scenarios, since handling a very long password is not a particular challenge for a machine (as opposed to a person).

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:

- Unauthorized access to the system
- Unauthorized access or tapping of data
- Unauthorized modification of data
- Unauthorized use of services or resources
- Denial of executed activities

ID: 3.01-27/9.0

Req 13	If a password is used as an authentication attribute, the reuse of previous passwords must be prevented.
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A history of the previously used passwords must be recorded for each user account. When a password change is initiated for a user account, the new password must be compared with this password history. If the reuse of a password is detected, the password change must be rejected. This validation process must be implemented in the system on the basis of technical measures. If a central IAM system is used for user authentication, the implementation can be forwarded to the central IAM system or outsourced there [see also Root Security Requirements Document[i] "3.69 IAM (Identity Access Management) - Framework"].

In general, the password history should ensure that a password that has already been used can never be used again.

However, due to technical limitations, a password history cannot be recorded indefinitely in many IT/NT products. In this case, the following basic rules must be observed:

- a password that has already been used must not be reusable for a period of at least 60 days (measured from the point in time at which the affected password was replaced by another)
- in systems in which the period of at least 60 days cannot be implemented, the longest possible period must be configured. In addition, it must be confirmed by a Project Security Manager (PSM) that the configured period is still sufficient in the overall context of the system with regard to the security requirement.

Annotation:

Some IT/NT products do not offer any technical configuration parameters with which the password history can be

linked directly to a time period, but only allow the definition of the number of passwords to be recorded. In such cases, the time period can alternatively be ensured by linking the following, usually generally available configuration parameters. Within the resulting policy, a user can only change his password once a day and, due to the number of passwords recorded, can reuse an old password effectively after 60 days at the earliest.

- Minimum Password Age: 1 day
- Password History: Record of the last 60 passwords used

With this implementation variant, it should be noted that the minimum age for the password should not be more than one day in order not to inappropriately restrict the user with regard to the fundamental need to be able to change the password independently at any time.

Motivation: Users prefer passwords that are easy to remember and often use them repeatedly over long periods of time when the system allows. From the user's point of view, the behavior is understandable, but effectively leads to a considerable reduction in the protective effect of this authentication parameter. With adequate knowledge of the user or information obtained from previous system compromises, an attacker can gain access to supposedly protected user accounts. Particularly in situations in which new initial passwords are assigned centrally as part of an acute risk treatment, but users change them immediately to a previous password for the sake of simplicity, there is a high risk that an attacker will resume illegal access. It is therefore important to prevent users from reusing old passwords.

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:

- Unauthorized access to the system
- Unauthorized access or tapping of data
- Unauthorized modification of data
- Unauthorized use of services or resources
- Denial of executed activities
- Attacks motivated and facilitated by information disclosure or visible security weaknesses

ID: 3.01-28/9.0

Req 14	If a password is used as an authentication attribute, it must be changed after 12 months at the latest.
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The maximum permitted usage period for passwords is 12 months.
If a password reaches the maximum permitted usage period, it must be changed.

For this purpose, the system must automatically inform the user about the expired usage period the next time he logs on to the system and immediately guide him through a dialog to change the password. Access to the system must no longer be permitted without a successfully completed password change.

For technical user accounts (M2M or Machine-2-Machine), which are used for the authentication and authorization of systems among themselves or by applications on a system, automated solutions must also be implemented to comply with the permitted usage period for passwords.

Alternatively, if such an automatic mapping of the process for changing the password cannot be implemented, an effective organizational measure must be applied instead, which ensures a binding manual password change at the end of the permissible period of use.

Motivation: Unlike more modern authentication attributes, passwords are easier to attack. Without specific measures for reliable, technically automated detection of compromises, the risk of a password being discovered or broken by an attacker can increase considerably over time.

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:

- Unauthorized access to the system
- Unauthorized access or tapping of data
- Unauthorized modification of data
- Unauthorized use of services or resources
- Attacks motivated and facilitated by information disclosure or visible security weaknesses

ID: 3.01-30/9.0

Req 15	If passwords are used as an authentication attribute, they must not be displayed in plain text during input.
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Passwords must not be displayed in legible plain text on screens or other output devices while they are entered. A display while entering must not allow any conclusions to be drawn about the characters actually used in the password.

This requirement applies to all types of password input masks and fields.

Examples of this are dialogs for password assignment, password-based login to systems or changing existing passwords.

Exceptions:

- Within an input field, an optional plain text representation of a password is permitted, provided that this plain-text representation serves a valid purpose, exists only temporarily, has to be explicitly activated by the legitimate user on a case-by-case basis and can also be deactivated again immediately by the latter.
A valid purpose would be, for example, to allow the legitimate user an uncomplicated visual check, if necessary, that he has entered the password correctly in a login dialog before finally completing the login.
Such an optional plain text representation of a password must remain fully in the control of the legitimate user so that he can decide on its activation/deactivation according to the situation. In the default setting of the system, the plain text representation must be deactivated.
- The typical behavior on many mobile devices (smartphones) of displaying each individual character very briefly in plain text when entering a password - in order to make it easier for the user to control input - is fundamentally permissible there. However, the full password must never be displayed in plain text on the screen.

Motivation: In the case of a plain text display, there is a risk that third parties can randomly or deliberately spy on a password via the screen output while typing.

Implementation example: When displayed on the screen, each individual character is uniformly replaced by a "*" while entering a password.

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:

- Unauthorized access to the system
- Unauthorized access or tapping of data
- Unauthorized modification of data
- Unauthorized use of services or resources
- Denial of executed activities
- Attacks motivated and facilitated by information disclosure or visible security weaknesses

ID: 3.01-31/9.0

Req 16	(Default) passwords on database systems must be changed.
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Motivation: Many database manufacturers provide various users with (default) passwords (sa/blank; DBSNMP/DBSNMP, etc.) during installation. An attacker can exploit the existence of these (default) passwords to obtain what tends to be privileged access to the database system.

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:

- Unauthorized access to the system

ID: 3.16-16/9.0

2.5. Principle of least privilege

Req 17	All database services must be set up in accordance with the least privilege principle on operating-system level.
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Motivation: By using the least privilege principle, the risk of system corruption can be reduced.

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:

- Unauthorized access to the system
- Unauthorized access or tapping of data
- Unauthorized modification of data
- Unauthorized use of services or resources

ID: 3.16-17/9.0

Req 18	A database service must not run with root or administrative rights.
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Motivation: If a database server runs with highly privileged operating-system rights (root, administrator), an attacker can completely take over a database system by exploiting a vulnerability (access to the file system or execution of files).

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:

- Unauthorized access to the system
- Unauthorized access or tapping of data
- Unauthorized modification of data
- Unauthorized use of services or resources

ID: 3.16-18/9.0

2.6. SQL functions and packages

This section defines requirements for extensions of the standard SQL command language through additional program packages. These program packages enable often access to operating system/file level or to external network services (e.g. HTTP servers).

Req 19	Extended SQL functions that are not required (e.g. T-SQL, PL/SQL, SQL PL, extended stored procedures) and/or packages from the database system must be deleted.
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Motivation: In many instances an attacker exploits such functions to transfer malware onto the system or execute commands with privileged rights.

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:

- Unauthorized use of services or resources

ID: 3.16-19/9.0

2.7. SQL extensions with operating-system or network access

Req 20	Database functions which permit access to operating-system files must be deleted or deactivated.
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Motivation: Some database systems allow access to the operating-system level via special stored procedures or SQL functions. A multitude of vulnerabilities of these procedures are known which allow an attacker to gain unauthorized access to a system or execute malware on the target system. These procedures are often provided with unnecessarily high, mainly privileged rights or allow anyone to execute programs without authentication. For example, malware exploits the procedures MS-SQL: xp_cmdshell and Oracle: utl_tcp.

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:

- Unauthorized use of services or resources

Req 21	Database functions which allow access to other network services (e.g. ,SMTP, HTTP, SNMP, FTP etc.), must be deleted or deactivated.
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Motivation: Some database systems provide functions that are normally offered by an application server. For instance it is possible via special stored procedures to send e-mails or launch web queries to external systems.

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:

- Unauthorized use of services or resources

Req 22	Database functions which allow access to the operating system level or network services, must not be accessible by the roles / groups "Public" and / or "Everyone".
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Motivation: Withdrawing rights can prevent the use of database functions to gain unauthorized access to network services and the operating-system level. Functions to execute operating-system commands and to use network services are thus only available to authorized users, and not to everyone.

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:

- Unauthorized access to the system
- Unauthorized access or tapping of data
- Unauthorized modification of data
- Unauthorized use of services or resources

2.8. Access rights

Req 23	The operating-system rights for the database files and directories (program, control, trace and log files) must be assigned exclusively to the database system's operating-system account.
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Some database systems store sensitive account data in plain text in trace or log files. Therefore, access rights to sensitive files and directories on the database system MUST be set so that non-administrative users do not have any read, write or execution rights.

Access to essential system files and directories on the database system must be reserved for the database system's user account.

Motivation: By implementing restrictive access rights, the risk of manipulation can be substantially reduced.

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:

- Unauthorized access to the system
- Unauthorized access or tapping of data
- Unauthorized modification of data
- Unauthorized use of services or resources

3. Data communications

This chapter summarizes security requirements that relate to querying and sharing data from other database systems.

The querying or sharing of data can be implemented either by means of so-called ad-hoc queries, or by setting a data connection to share data between the systems. The terminology and the technical implementation of such a data connection varies greatly among manufacturers (MS-SQL: linked servers/replication; Oracle: database links; DB2: connections). To simplify matters, the term 'database connections' is used below in a general sense.

Req 24	Database accesses between various database systems must be comply with the least privilege principle.
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Motivation: Limiting the access rights reduces the attack surface.

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:

- Unauthorized access to the system
- Unauthorized access or tapping of data
- Unauthorized modification of data
- Unauthorized use of services or resources

ID: 3.16-24/9.0

Req 25	Database accesses between various database systems must be made via an individual user account.
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Motivation: Accesses shall be made via a special user. Only in this way can access rights be individually restricted to the absolute minimum level.

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:

- Unauthorized access to the system
- Unauthorized access or tapping of data
- Unauthorized modification of data
- Unauthorized use of services or resources

ID: 3.16-25/9.0

4. System monitoring

4.1. Logging

Req 26	Accesses to database systems, as well as critical database procedures and database content must be logged.
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Secure, traceable database operation requires important operating information to be logged. This includes, for instance, the logging of failed login attempts to uncover possible intrusion attempts.

Logging of security-relevant user actions shall comply with national legislation currently in force.

When implementing measures resulting from this Requirement, the applicable participation rights of the responsible employee representatives/trade unions as well as the works and collective agreements shall be observed.

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:

- Unnoticeable feasible attacks

ID: 3.16-26/9.0

Req 27	Security-related events must be logged with an exact timestamp and a unique system reference.
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Security-relevant are any events that may have an impact on the information security (confidentiality, integrity, availability) of a system or indicate its misuse. Systems must log the occurrence of security-related events.

In order to enable the assignment and evaluation of these events, they must be logged together with a unique system name (e.g. host name, IP or MAC address) and the exact time of occurrence ("time stamp"). At a minimum, the timestamp of a logged event must include the following information:

- date of the event (Year, Month, Day)
- time of the event (Hours, Minutes, Seconds)
- Timezone, those information belongs to

The security relevance of specific events depends on the type and function of the system as well as the data processed in it. Therefore, it is not possible to specify a uniform list of events that are relevant to security. Relevant events must be identified according to the system. The following list contains typical security-related events and is accordingly to be understood as a basic guide for the identification of security-relevant events for a particular system.

Security-related Event	Information to log to the event
Failed login attempts	• affected user account • number of failed attempts • source of access (IP address, client-ID/client-name, local console, ...)
System access via user accounts (including system accounts or technical user accounts)	• affected user account • Access start/end time (login/logout) • source of access (IP address, client-ID/client-name, local console, ...)
Modifications of user accounts (including system accounts or technical user accounts)	• user account used to make the modification • user account to which the modification was made • type of modification made (create, activate, deactivate, delete, password reset, ...)

Changes to role assignments/permissions of user accounts (including system accounts or technical user accounts)	• user account used to make the modification • user account to which the modification was made • name of the affected role, type of the affected permission • type of modification made (role/permission added, role/permission removed, ...)
Use/initiation of critical system functions	• user account used to make the use • name/type of system function used
Access to sensitive data processed in the system	• user account used to access the data • Name of the affected data field (the contents of the data field should not be logged to prevent data leakage via log files) • type of access (read, modify, delete, ...)
Abnormal increase in the utilization of system resources, such as memory, CPU, network, or disk access, over an extended period of time	• threshold of the affected system resource • duration of exceeding the threshold • threshold exceedance Depending on the individual system, sensible threshold values must be defined.
Other events that may provide evidence of attempted or successful attacks against the system *)	• individually depending on the type of event

*) This requires identifying the most important forms of attack that the system can typically expect and ensuring that events relevant to their detection are actually logged by the system. As a rule, this can only be guaranteed by the developer/manufacture of the system.

When logging, the applicable legal and operational regulations must be observed. The latter also include agreements that have been made with the company's social partners. Following these regulations logging of events is only allowed for a defined use case. Logging of events for doing a work control of employees is not allowed.

In addition - as for any data that is processed by a system - an appropriate protection requirement must also be taken into account and implemented for logging data; this applies to storage, transmission and access. In particular, if the logging data contains real data, the same protection requirements must be taken into account that is also used for the regular processing of this real data within the source system.

Motivation: Logging security-relevant events is a basic requirement for detecting ongoing attacks as well as attacks that have already occurred. This is the only way in which suitable measures can be taken to maintain or restore system security. Logging data could be used as evidence to take legal steps against attackers.

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:

- Denial of executed activities
- Unnoticeable feasible attacks

ID: 3.01-33/9.0

Req 28 Applicable retention and deletion periods must be observed for security-relevant logging data that is recorded locally.

From an IT security perspective, local storage of security-relevant logging data on a system is not mandatory. Since the local storage can be damaged in the event of system malfunctions or manipulated by a successful attacker, it can only be used to a limited extent for security-related or forensic analyses. Accordingly, it is relevant for IT security that logging data is forwarded to a separate log server.

Local storage can nevertheless take place; for example, if local storage is initially indispensable when generating the

logging data due to technical processes or if there are justified operational interests in also keeping logging data available locally.

The following basic rules must be taken into account when storing logging data locally:

- Security-related logging data must be retained for a period of 90 days.
(*This requirement only applies if no additional forwarding to a separate log server is implemented on the system and the logging data is therefore only recorded locally.*)
- After 90 days, stored logging data must be deleted immediately.

Deviances

Different retention periods and deletion periods may exist due to legal or regulatory requirements (especially in connection with personal data) or may be defined by contractual agreements. In these cases, the applicable periods must be agreed individually with a Project Security Manager (PSM) / Data Privacy Advisor (DPA) or are specified by them.

Motivation: Logging data is an immensely important IT security tool for preventing, detecting and clearing up system faults, security and data privacy incidents. On the other hand, the recording of logging data, like any other data processing, is also subject to legal and regulatory requirements. Accordingly, guidelines must be adhered to that reconcile the two.

Implementation example: Taking into account the current legal situation and applicable data privacy regulations, the following deletion periods for locally stored security-relevant logging data are implemented on an exemplary telecommunications system:

- Standard System Logs: Deletion after 90 days at the latest
- Logging of public IP addresses: Deletion (or anonymization) after 7 days at the latest
- Logging of the assignment of dynamic public IP addresses by the telecommunication solution: Deletion after 7 days at the latest
- Logging of non-billing-relevant call detail records: Deletion after 7 days at the latest
- Logging of the content of e-mail and SMS: Deletion after 24 hours at the latest
- Logging of the domain queries handled by the DNS server of the telecommunications solution: Deletion after 24 hours at the latest

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:

- Unauthorized access or tapping of data
- Denial of executed activities
- Unnoticeable feasible attacks

ID: 3.01-34/9.0

Req 29	Security-relevant logging data must be forwarded to a log server immediately after it has been generated.
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The system's security-relevant logging data must be forwarded to a log server immediately after it has been generated. For the purposes of the requirement, the log server must meet the following criteria:

- The log server must be dedicated to the storage of logging data. It must not depict any other functions or services that are not related to this task. A permissible exception is the combination of a log server with a SIEM (Security Information and Event Management) solution.
- The log server must be separate from the system. It must not be operated directly on the system as an additional module.
- The log server must be centrally available for the operational environment, to which the system belongs.

To transmit the logging data to the log server, standard protocols specialized for this purpose (e.g. Syslog or SNMPv3) should preferably be used

Motivation: If logging data is stored only locally, it can be manipulated in the event of a successful compromise of the system by an attacker in order to obfuscate their attack and actions taken on the system. For this reason, the forwarding of logging data to a log server must take place very soon after the occurrence of a security-relevant event in the source system. This means that the logging data generated is separated from the source system and is available for analysis at any time, regardless of the source system state. The use of a central log server for an operational environment ensures that the logs of all IT/NT Systems in this operational environment can be accessed quickly and uniformly and that the access itself can be optimally integrated into the incident processes of the environment.

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:

- Unauthorized modification of data
- Disruption of availability
- Denial of executed activities
- Unnoticeable feasible attacks

ID: 3.01-35/9.0

Req 30	For security-relevant logging data that is forwarded to the log server, compliance with the applicable retention and deletion periods must be ensured.
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The following basic rules must be taken into account:

- security-related logging data must be retained for a period of 90 days on the log server.
- after 90 days, stored logging data must be deleted immediately on the log server.

Deviances

Different retention periods and deletion periods may exist due to legal or regulatory requirements (especially in connection with personal data) or may be defined by contractual agreements. In these cases, the applicable periods must be agreed individually with a Project Security Manager (PSM) / Data Privacy Advisor (DSB) or are specified by them.

Log server under the responsibility of a third party

If the selected log server is not within the same operational responsibility as the source system of the logging data, it must be ensured that the responsible operator of the log server is aware of the valid parameters for the logging data to be received and that they are adhered to in accordance with the regulations mentioned here.

Motivation: Logging data is an immensely important IT security tool for preventing, detecting and clearing up system faults, security and data privacy incidents. On the other hand, the recording of logging data, like any other data processing, is also subject to legal and regulatory requirements. Accordingly, guidelines must be adhered to that reconcile the two.

Implementation example: Taking into account the current legal situation and applicable data privacy regulations, the following deletion periods for forwarded security-relevant logging data from an exemplary telecommunications system are implemented on the separate log server:

- Standard System Logs: Deletion after 90 days at the latest
- Logging of public IP addresses: Deletion (or anonymization) after 7 days at the latest
- Logging of the assignment of dynamic public IP addresses by the telecommunication solution: Deletion after 7 days at the latest
- Logging of non-billing-relevant call detail records: Deletion after 7 days at the latest
- Logging of the content of e-mail and SMS: Deletion after 24 hours at the latest
- Logging of the domain queries handled by the DNS server of the telecommunications solution: Deletion after 24 hours at the latest

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:

- Unauthorized access or tapping of data

- Denial of executed activities
- Unnoticeable feasible attacks

ID: 3.01-36/9.0

Req 31	Security-relevant logging data must be provided to a security incident detection and response solution in near-real-time.
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An acceptable detection and response solution for the purposes of this requirement must meet the following criteria:

- There is a continuous analysis and correlation of the logging data provided by connected IT/NT Systems.
- The identification of threatening activities and ongoing attacks takes place on the basis of a continuously updated detection pattern database
- Integrated alerting processes trigger the initiation of countermeasures in the event of a find.
- Security experts are actively involved in the operation of the solution as well as the evaluation of alarms

Such a solution is not the same as a log server in terms of its function. Accordingly, the provision to a detection and response solution must always be in addition to an existing forwarding to a log server. An exception exists if the log server used provides the logging data to a detection and response solution immediately after receipt. In this case, it is sufficient for the system to forward the logging data only to the log server.

The logging data must be provided to the detection and response solution within 5 minutes ("near-real-time") from the time it is generated in the system.

The specific technical interfaces and protocols to be supported for deployment are determined by the detection and response solution available in the system's operating environment as well as the technical basis of the system itself.

Motivation: IT/NT systems are constantly exposed to security threats and attacks. By means of a central analysis and the correlation of recorded system events of entire IT landscapes in almost real time, current threats and ongoing attacks can be detected even beyond system boundaries and appropriate countermeasures can be initiated promptly. The prompt delivery of logging data to the detection and response solution is essential for its effectiveness.

Implementation example: **Example 1:** A system based on a classic server collects security-relevant logging data in the operating system's local syslog or Windows Event Log. Logging data is continuously forwarded to a Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) for further analysis, intrusion detection, and alarm handling.

Example 2: An Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agent is running on a system. The EDR agent continuously forwards the security-related logging data it collects on the system to the central backend of the EDR solution, where further analysis, intrusion detection, and alarm handling takes place

Example 3: Network components provide events to a SIEM that make it possible to detect suspicious communication behavior such as network scans, unauthorized data flows between network segments, or active connections or connection attempts to suspicious destinations on the Internet. In particular, gateway routers from the CNDTAG provide "Netflow" logs, while forward proxies report access to domains and/or IP addresses and firewalls log blocked connection attempts.

Example 4: Systems designed on the basis of cloud-native functions generate logging data directly from these functions using the cloud's own logging and monitoring infrastructure. In such a system, the generation of security-relevant logging data is specifically activated in the corresponding configuration options of the cloud-native functions used. The resulting logging data is continuously transferred to a SIEM (Security Information and Event Management) for further analysis, intrusion detection and alarm handling. Some cloud providers already provide some attack pattern detection in the cloud's own monitoring infrastructure and generate specific cloud alerts from it. These are also transferred to the SIEM.

Example 5: A system is based on a SaaS ("Software as a Service") application from a cloud provider. Typically, in the SaaS model, the cloud provider is responsible for all operational aspects of the application, including security management. The cloud customer itself has no influence on the underlying technical infrastructure or the operation of the application. Based on contractual agreements, recognized certificates, and documented self-disclosures from the cloud provider, it is formally verified that the cloud provider has implemented a security incident detection and response solution. Some cloud providers also generate dedicated logging data about security-relevant activities within

the separate customer tenants of their SaaS application (e.g. changes to configuration settings, permission assignments or user accounts within the tenants) and make them available to cloud customers. These so-called audit logs are continuously transferred to a SIEM (Security Information and Event Management) for further analysis, attack detection and alarm handling.

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:

- Unnoticeable feasible attacks

ID: 3.01-37/9.0

4.2. Auditing and monitoring

Req 32	Important database services and instances must be monitored continually for misuse scenarios.
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The monitoring of user actions for misuse shall comply with national legislation currently in force (for details see the "Security Requirement on Misuse Detection").

There must be a case study regarding the type of service/user data/number of entries and possible misuse scenarios to define the necessary level of monitoring of the cases. Insider threats

- Anomaly detection
- Accidental exposure
- Misconfiguration
- Vulnerable application
- Machine Language models
- Insecure data in transit
- ...

Motivation: There are many conceivable ways to misuse database systems. Users generate an unusually high data usage rate or operate at unusual times of day. Attackers utilize unusual and critical commands for database queries, as well as tools and malware to extend their rights. To detect misuse, database systems should be continually monitored for misuse scenarios, e.g. by means of database triggers and log monitoring.

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:

- Unauthorized access to the system
- Unauthorized access or tapping of data
- Unauthorized modification of data
- Unauthorized use of services or resources

ID: 3.16-32/9.0

Req 33	Mass data exfiltration must be detected if more than 100K customer data entry and DPC2 or DPC3 is present.
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Mass data exfiltration detection is a critical control that monitors for unusually large volumes of data being transferred internally or leaving the corporate network or database systems. When more than 100K customer data records - particularly classified as DPC2 or DPC3 - are accessed, copied, or transferred, automated alerts should be triggered. This threshold-based detection should be integrated with SIEM and User and Entity Behavior Analytics (UEBA) tools to identify deviations from normal access patterns. The system should correlate access context (user role, time, data sensitivity, and transfer channel) to distinguish legitimate bulk operations from potential exfiltration attempts. Upon detection, predefined incident response workflows should immediately isolate the activity, notify the security operations center, and preserve forensic evidence for investigation.

Motivation: Customer data are one of the most valuable assets of the company. Therefore we must take every measures to avoid mass data leakage, malicious act or misuse. For that purpose we need to know how we are handling and using our datasets.

Implementation example: Technical guidance and implementation details are also provided on that page and are continuously maintained:

<https://yam-united.telekom.com/pages/psa/apps/wiki/wiki-sicherheitsanforderungen/list>

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:

- Unauthorized access or tapping of data
- Unauthorized modification of data
- Attacks motivated and facilitated by information disclosure or visible security weaknesses

ID: 3.16-33/9.0

5. Technical Baseline Security for IT/NT Systems

5.1. Authentication and authorization

Req 34	The use of system functions that require protection as well as access to internal or confidential data must not be possible without prior authentication and authorization.
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The use of functions of the system that require protection as well as access to data classified as internal or confidential must only be possible after the user has been uniquely identified and successfully authenticated by means of a user account. A user account consists of a unique user name and associated authentication features. In addition, it must be verified that the user is authorized to access the affected functions and data within the user role assigned to him or her in the system.

An exception to this are functions and data that may be used publicly without restriction; for example, the area of a website on the Internet where only public information is provided.

Examples of features that require prior authentication include:

- Remote access to network services (such as SSH, SFTP, web services)
- Local access to the management console
- Local use of operating system and applications

This requirement also applies without restriction to any machine access to the system (Here, implementation is usually carried out through the use of so-called "technical user accounts", also known as "machine-2-machine" or "M2M" accounts).

Motivation: The unambiguous authentication and authorization of access to a system are elementary to protect functions and data from misuse.

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:

- Unauthorized access to the system
- Unauthorized access or tapping of data
- Unauthorized modification of data
- Unauthorized use of services or resources
- Denial of executed activities

ID: 3.01-19/9.0

Req 35	User accounts must be protected with at least two authentication features from different factors.
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All user accounts of the system must be protected from unauthorized use.

This is to be achieved by using authentication features that allow the legitimate user to be uniquely identified.

Authentication features are differentiated into superordinate groups, so-called "factors":

- Factor KNOWLEDGE: "something that only the legitimate user knows"
- Factor POSSESSION: "something that only the legitimate user possesses"
- Factor INHERENCE: "something that only the legitimate user is"

At least two authentication features must be combined.

These must come from different factors ("Multi-Factor Authentication"; short: "MFA").

A combination of authentication features of the same factor (example: two different PINs) is not allowed.

Examples of acceptable authentication features

- from the KNOWLEDGE factor: PINs, passphrases (passwords*)
- from the POSSESSION factor: smart cards, FIDO 2 Level 2 security keys, device-bound passkeys, cryptographic keys stored in a TPM/HSM, OTPs (One-Time Passwords) generated in an authenticator app that has been approved for use in Deutsche Telekom
- from the INHERENCE factor: biometric features such as fingerprints, iris or retina scans, face recognition

*) Important note on the use of passwords

Passwords must be strictly avoided as an authentication feature.

They are only acceptable if more secure alternatives cannot be implemented.

Authentication features that can be easily forged or manipulated are generally not permitted.

These include:

- Phone numbers and caller IDs
- IP addresses
- Geographical locations
- VPN affiliations and network information
- Status of clients, such as workstation systems or mobile devices

Note on technical user accounts

Technical user accounts used for machine access (also known as "machine-to-machine" or "M2M" accounts) are exempt from the obligation to use multi-factor authentication, as this is usually not feasible there.

Motivation: User accounts that are not protected by appropriate authentication features can be abused by an attacker to gain unauthorized access to a system and the data and applications stored on it. Due to a variety of common attack methods, the protection of user accounts by a single authentication feature is now considered weak, especially if the classic password is used here. A combination of authentication features from different factors significantly increases security for user accounts.

Implementation example: Examples of MFA

MFA Combination	Description	Application Note
Telekom "myCard" plus PIN	1st Factor: Certificate implemented in hardware ("Possession") 2nd Factor: PIN ("Knowledge")	(none)
FIDO2 Level 2 Security Key plus fingerprint	1st Factor: Crypto key stored in hardware ("Possession") 2nd Factor: Biometric feature ("Inherence")	Biometric feature must be pre-configured, otherwise the biometric sensor will only work as a "button" and does not provide the 2nd factor ("Inherence").
Device-bound Passkey in WH4B* on Nucleus PC plus PIN	1st Factor: Crypto key stored in hardware ("Possession") 2nd Factor: PIN ("Knowledge")	(none)
Device-bound Passkey in Secure Enclave on iOS Device plus FaceID	1st Factor: Crypto key stored in hardware ("Possession") 2nd Factor: Biometric feature ("Inherence")	(none)

Password plus OTP App approved for use (e.g. MS Authenticator)	1st Factor: Password ("Knowledge") 2nd Factor: specific generated One Time Password ("Possession")	Passwords are only eligible if more secure alternatives cannot be implemented. The synchronization of the authentic- ator app via a cloud service as well as sharing (e.g. via a pass- word manager) the OTP is not permitted.
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*) WH4B: "Windows Hello for Business"

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:

- Unauthorized access to the system
- Unauthorized access or tapping of data
- Unauthorized modification of data
- Unauthorized use of services or resources
- Denial of executed activities

ID: 3.01-20/9.0

Req 36 Privileged user accounts must be protected with at least two authentication features that come from different factors and provide increased resilience against phishing attacks.

A privileged user account is a user account that has advanced permissions within a system. Advanced permissions allow access to configuration settings, features, or data assets that are not available to regular users of the system. In direct dependence on the specific tasks performed by means of a privileged user account within a system, the advanced permissions assigned may be specifically limited or may include fully unrestricted system access.

Examples of privileged user accounts:

- Accounts for administration, maintenance, or troubleshooting tasks
- Accounts for user administration tasks (e.g. creating/deleting users; Assign permissions; password resets)
- Accounts that are authorized to legitimize, trigger, or stop business-critical operations
- Accounts with access to data classified as SCD (Sensitive Customer Data) in the interest of the Group Deutsche Telekom, its customers or the public
- Accounts that have extensive access to data defined as "personal" according to the EU-GDPR (e.g. mass retrieval of larger parts or the entire database)

To protect privileged user accounts, at least two authentication features must be combined. These must come from different factors ("KNOWLEDGE", "POSSESSION" or "INHERENCE"). A combination of authentication features of the same factor is not permitted. At least one of the authentication features must not be vulnerable to phishing attacks.

In a phishing attack, the legitimate user is trickily manipulated to reveal his login data to the attacker, for example by means of fake login pages. A phishing attack can also be carried out against a combination of multiple authentication features.

Phishing-resilient authentication features prevent attacks based on their technical implementation. These authentication features use cryptographic methods and create a strong bond between the user, the device and the service. They also require manual user interaction during authentication, which cannot be automated; for example, to submit a fingerprint scan to a hardware token.

Considered not vulnerable to phishing attacks are

- FIDO2 Level 2 Security Keys
- Certificates implemented in hardware

Important note on the use of passwords

Passwords must be strictly avoided as an authentication feature.

They are only acceptable if more secure alternatives cannot be implemented.

Note on technical user accounts

Technical user accounts used for machine access (also known as "machine-to-machine" or "M2M" accounts) are exempt from the obligation to use multi-factor authentication, as this is usually not feasible there.

Motivation: Privileged user accounts pose an increased risk to the security of a system. If an attacker successfully compromises such a user account, they will be granted broad privileges that allow them to take control of the system or system parts, disrupt system functions, view/manipulate processed data, or influence business-critical operations. The combination of multiple authentication features of different types already significantly minimizes the risk of a user account being compromised, but for privileged user accounts, special attention must be paid to resilience against phishing attacks. The phishing attacks that can be observed are becoming increasingly tricky and difficult for users to detect, so that multifactor authentication without increased resilience against phishing can no longer be considered sufficient for privileged user accounts.

Implementation example: Examples of MFA with increased resilience to phishing attacks

MFA Combination	Description	Application Note
Telekom "myCard" plus PIN	1st Factor: Certificate implemented in hardware ("Possession") 2nd Factor: PIN ("Knowledge")	(none)
FIDO2 Level 2 Security Key plus fingerprint	1st Factor: Crypto key stored in hardware ("Possession") 2nd Factor: Biometric feature ("Inherence")	Biometric feature must be pre-configured, otherwise the biometric sensor will only work as a "button" and does not provide the 2nd factor ("Inherence").
FIDO2 Level 2 Security Key plus PIN	1st Factor: Crypto key stored in hardware ("Possession") 2nd Factor: PIN ("Knowledge")	(none)

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:

- Unauthorized access to the system
- Unauthorized access or tapping of data
- Unauthorized modification of data
- Unauthorized use of services or resources
- Denial of executed activities

ID: 3.01-21/9.0

Req 37 User accounts must ensure the unique identification of the user.

Users must be identified unambiguously by the system.

This can typically be reached by using a unique user account per user.

So-called group accounts, which are characterized by the fact that they are used jointly by several people, must not be used. This also applies without restriction to privileged user accounts. Most systems initially have only a single user account with administrative privileges after the basic installation. If the system is to be administered by several persons, each of these persons must use a personal, individual user account to which appropriate administrative authorizations or roles are assigned

A special feature are so named technical user accounts. These are used for the authentication and authorization of systems among themselves or of applications on a system and can therefore not be assigned to a specific person. Such user accounts must be assigned on a per system or per application basis. In this connection, it has to be ensured that these user accounts can't be misused.

Ways to prevent misuse of such user accounts by individuals include:

- Configuration of a password that meets the security requirements and is known to as few administrators as possible.
- Configuring the user account that only a local use is possible and a interactive login isn't possible.
- Use of a technique for authentication of the specific user account with public and private key or certificates.
- Limiting the access over the network to legitimate systems.

Additional solution must be checked on their usability per individual case.

Motivation: Unambiguous user identification is mandatory to assign a user permissions that are necessary to perform the required tasks on the system. This is the only way to adequately control access to system data and services and to prevent misuse. Furthermore, it makes it possible to log activities and actions on a system and to assign them to individual users.

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:

- Unauthorized access to the system
- Unauthorized access or tapping of data
- Unauthorized modification of data
- Unauthorized use of services or resources
- Denial of executed activities

ID: 3.01-22/9.0

Req 38	The permissions for users and applications must be limited to the extent necessary to fulfill their tasks.
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The permissions on a system must be restricted to such an extent that a user can only access data and use functions that he needs in the context of his work. Appropriate permissions must also be assigned for access to files that are part of the operating system or applications or that are generated by the same (e.g. configuration and logging files).

In addition to access to data, applications and their components must also be executed with the lowest possible permissions. Applications should not be run with administrator or system privileges.

Motivation: If a user is granted too far-reaching permissions on a system, he can access data and applications to an extent that is not necessary for the fulfillment of the assigned tasks. This creates an unnecessarily increased risk in the event of abuse, in particular if the user or his user account is compromised by an attacker.

Applications with too far-reaching permissions can be misused by an attacker to gain or expand unauthorized access to data and system areas in need of protection.

For this requirement the following threats are relevant:

- Unauthorized access to the system
- Unauthorized access or tapping of data
- Unauthorized modification of data
- Unauthorized use of services or resources
- Denial of executed activities

ID: 3.01-23/9.0